Evolutionary Explanations of Affect Regulation

Evolutionary Explanations of Affect Regulation

Evolutionary Psychology

The theory of evolution by natural selection was recognized over 150 years ago (Darwin, 1859). It has only been in the past 20 years that psychological, social, and behavior sciences have began to integrate the principles already deeply incorporated in biology and ecology. The goal of evolutionary psychology is not only to incorporate evolutionary biology, anthropology, neuroscience, and cognitive psychology to map human nature but also to rewrite existing literature, framing previous efforts into this perspective (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992.) It is worth mentioning that evolutionary psychology is not to be acknowledged as a subset of psychology, like social psychology or cognitive psychology, but rather “a way of thinking about psychology” available as a lens for viewing any topic therein (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000. Pg 1.)

Emotions

Emotions, and the theory surrounding them, were some of the first constructs Tooby and Cosmides examined when looking to apply their concepts and methods to cognitive science (Tooby, 1985; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990.) The acceptance and prevalent use of the evolutionary explanation of emotions has been long withstanding. Emotions are super-ordinate programs, when activated by a recurrent adaptive problem, activate and deactivate a multitude of cognitive components, which guide the organism to an outcome promoting reproduction, thus increasing fitness (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000.)  Emotions influence goals, prioritize motivation, prompt information gathering, impose a conceptual framework, alter perception, affect memory, direct attention, mobilize physiology, and facilitate communication (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000.) Emotions can influence behavior, specialize inferential thinking, stimulate reflexes, promote learning, color events, determine effort allocation, recalibrate current experience, alter infinite outcomes of behaviors, and propel culture (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000.)

Affect Regulation

Affect regulation is defined as the things we do to influence which emotions we experience, when we experience them, and how we experience and express them (Gross, 1998.) Affect regulation is primarily referred to as a diverse set of processes by which emotions are regulated (Gross, 1999.) Important to this discussion is the other function of affect regulation: how individuals influence their own emotions and how these influence other’s emotions (Gross, 1999.)  It is through this mechanism of regulation that emotions co-evolved with to convey information about an individual’s state to others (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000.) Being able to effectively regulate your current emotions in order to communicate your internal state would be necessary in order to successfully survive and reproduce. In particular, evolutionary psychology helps clarify the goals of affective regulation, especially when the current environment is dramatically different from the environment to which these emotions and mechanisms to regulate them evolved (Gross, 1999.) These evolutionarily relevant goals range from evading a predator to selecting a successful mate. It is commonly understood that these archaic emotions prompt responses that are useless, appraisals that are a waste of time, or responses that are conflicting with important goals (Gross, 1999.)  However, this is a common misunderstanding. Painful states or overzealous responses to stress are evolved defense patterns that proved to be invaluable in our evolutionary past, just as much as the cough of a pneumatic (Nesse, 1990.) Defective regulation of affect causes suffering, more than just anxiety, sadness, or anger. It is this evolutionary perspective that allows an understanding of these regulatory mechanisms in an ultimate sense, independent of their misunderstood proximate reasons. When looking to understand the mechanisms of an emotion, even one that seems not adaptive such as anxiety, it is best to look at the cognitive and physiological mechanisms that regulate that emotion (Nesse, 1990.) Emotion, the cues that elicit them, and the resulting regulatory behaviors are different in cultures and individuals, but in no way does this undercut an evolutionary approach (Nesse, 1990.) The tool-box hypothesis was formed by natural selection: “far more useful than fixed patterns of response are patterns and regulatory mechanisms that adjust to the needs of the current environment;” it is natural selection that makes this flexibility possible (Nesse, 1990, pg. 280.)  For example, our current environment would establish that guns, cars, and electrical outlets are dangerous and should elicit an appropriate amount of fear, while in the EEA heights, darkness, and spiders posed dangerous threats and induced fear; conditioning the former requires great effort (Nesse, 1990.) Consequently, natural selection doesn’t necessitate rigid patterns of response: instead it shaped a tendency to establish certain avoidance reactions and the capacity to modify these responses to our current environment (Nesse, 1990.) 

The ability to regulate affect voluntarily arises from several cortical regions, most developed within the human species.  The anterior cingulated cortex (ACC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and prefrontal cortex (PFC) are thought to be the neural correlates of affect regulation (for review, Beer & Lombardo, 2005.) In regards to affect generation, detection, and attention direction the amygdala has been found to be responsible (Lieberman et al., 2007.) 

Effortful Control and Affect Regulation

Evidence in the field of cognitive neuroscience has established that there are two distinct forms of cognitive processing: implicit and explicit. Implicit cognitive systems are outside consciousness, automatic, swift, effortless, and an adaptation from evolution; explicit cognitive systems are conscious, controllable, slow, limited, effortful, and acquired through culture (MacDonald, 2008). Implicit processing is recruited reflexively when encountering evolutionarily relevant stimuli; explicit processing is recruited when confronted with a situation that is novel, requiring flexibility and planning of response (MacDonald, 2008). Conflict arises when one must exert control over implicit processes; this can occur in two domains: cognitive (deemed executive function) and socioaffective (deemed effortful control) (MacDonald, 2008). Through time, however, implicit affective adaptations are subject to being controlled by the explicit processing mechanisms (MacDonald, 2008.) This arose as a consequence of our newfound ability to think ahead, examine information that is not evolutionarily recurrent, and weigh costs and benefits of our behavioral outcomes (MacDonald, 2008).

This effortful control is what we know as affect regulation. Whether or not a man utilizes aggression (successfully down-regulation of aggression) toward his romantic rival rests upon his ability to evaluate the potential costs and benefits of his action; the conflict lies within his ability to override the implicit processing (desire for revenge) with explicit processing (fear of prison) (MacDonald, 2008.)  Not only are these behavioral examples indicative of the overlap between effortful control and affect regulation, but research on human brain evolution also indicates this overlap. Affective states, consequence of implicit processing, like fear in a dangerous situation, arise through pathways directly from the amygdala (LeDoux, 2000) while explicit processing is seated in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (MacDonald, 2008). Neuropsychological research has also placed affective regulation in the PFC (Beer & Lombardo, 2007; Davison, Fox, & Kalin, 2007; Lieberman et al., 2007; and Phan et al., 2005.) The overlap of these prefrontal cortex regions are indicative of how the ability to weigh costs and benefits of behavioral outcomes would lead to an increase in fitness. In socioaffective control literature the VMFPC, OFC, and ventral ACC are implicated (MacDonald, 2008). Damage to the OFC, DLPFC, VMPFC, and ACC in humans is indicative of regulatory and effortful control dysfunction (for review, Beer & Lombardo, 2005.) Activation in these cortical areas serves to inhibit activation in other areas, specifically the OFC (Beer & Lombardo, 2007; and MacDonald, 2008.) Individuals that exhibit low effortful control also have lower ability at regulation of negative affect. This alludes to the consistent overlap between effortful control and affect regulation; giving rise to the necessity of consolidation of investigative efforts.

This significant overlap in literature signals the necessity for evolutionary psychology to be then lens to which affective regulation researchers look through. For example, the often held notion as disruptive and unnecessary reflexive leap backward at the sight of a snake is merely an installment of evolutionary design; in a situation where to err is fatal, this reflex is to prevent the organism from potential harm, while the slow, explicit processing of the actual curved stick reveals its true self. Research on implicit and explicit methods of affect regulation is relatively recent (Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011.) This explicit processing is critical to adaptive function and thus adaptive affect regulation. MacDonald (2008) proposed that the prefrontal mechanisms of effortful control are generally to inhibit short-term gains in return for long-term payoffs. This exact statement can be rephrased in terminology seen in affect regulation literature: the prefrontal mechanisms act non-hedonically, instead operating in favor of utilitarian regulation motives (see Tamir, Chiu, & Gross, 2007.) This captures the necessity for collaboration of evolutionary psychologists and affect psychologists to provide a better and comprehensive understanding of the emotions and the regulatory strategies utilized to govern them. However, why we evolved this affect regulation ability has been answered, but to serve what purpose? Humans are not only emotional animals, but social animals as well.

The Social Emotions and Affect Regulation

Interactions between people are the result of two mechanisms: kin selection and reciprocal altruism (Nesse, 1990.) Kin selection operates upon Hamilton’s rule: where the genetic relatedness of the recipient is multiplied by the reproductive benefit gained by the recipient, this being greater than the reproductive cost incurred on the giver (Nesse, 1990.) The more genetic material you share with someone, the more likely you are to help him or her. Reciprocal altruism operates upon cooperation with individuals that probably don’t share genetic material with you (Nesse, 1990.) The prisoner’s dilemma game is utilized when trying to explain the benefits of cooperation between individuals: constant cooperation yields the maximum long-term benefits for both players and thus is the optimal result of the game. Reciprocal relationships are human pattern interactions that occur daily: from giving a friend a ride to school to lending them a substantial amount of money. Social emotions function within these reciprocal relationships: individuals that constantly cooperate experience friendship, love, obligation, and pride; individuals that constantly defect experience rejection and hatred; and individuals that defect when one cooperates experience anger, anxiety, and guilt (Nesse, 1990.) 

The social emotions serve adaptive functions through a multitude of avenues. The positive emotions elicited by constant cooperation act as mediators of commitment (Nesse, 1990.) The negative emotions elicited when the other person defects when you cooperate, such as anger, serve adaptive purposes (Nesse, 1990.) Affect regulation research has revealed that negative affect, such as anger, is preferred when preparing for confrontation (Tamir & Ford, 2009.) This can also be said of someone that was recently betrayed in a reciprocal relationship: anger is a signal that the defection has been detected and is not tolerated in the future by that individual (Nesse, 1990.) Any potential defector will be less likely to defect against the individual that effectively displays anger and more likely to cooperate upon future interactions. Anxiety also serves an adaptive purpose, as it motivates cooperation even when the interaction is least desirable (Nesse, 1990.) This anxiety is reflected in the non-hedonic preferences of individuals when addressing self-relevant goals: such as confronting an individual that has compromised your reciprocal relationship (Tamir and Ford, 2009.) Although helping a younger sibling study for an exam on a Friday night seems unpleasant, the anxiety that the impending exam elicits motivates the individual away from immediate pleasure (inebriation) and instead towards the long-term payoff (future cooperation.) It is this ability to cooperate between two individuals that lead to the formation of small groups over the course of human evolution. The necessity for survival and reproduction within small groups serve as the purpose for effortful control and for adaptive social emotions.

Affect Regulation in Groups

Early in the course of human evolution, in order to successfully survive and reproduce, one must be within a small group of cooperating individuals (Buss & Kenrick, 1998.) This strategy leads to the greatest benefits in reproduction and thus favored by natural selection. The interactions among these smalls groups, along with the moods and emotions experienced in these groups, are essential to human life; studying the cause and effect of affect within a group is becoming increasingly interesting to researchers (Spoor & Kelly, 2004.) Spoor and Kelly (2004) proposed “the experience of shared affective states within groups, as well as specific mechanisms to regulate and maintain certain affective states in groups, developed because of their adaptive value within the context of group living” (Spoor & Kelly, 2004, p. 398.) Since the early environment of evolutionary adaptedness forced humans to living in small groups, and the structure within these groups limited by kin selection and reciprocal altruism, it is important to study the affect experience of these individuals in order to better understand emotions and the regulation of them today. The problem of cooperation would have been the primary adaptive problem for humans, especially since groups often included members that might not share genetic material with each other directly (Brewer, 1997.) It is postulated that the development of moods and emotions in groups serves as the driving force that coordinates group activity through the communication of information among the group and facilitation of group bonds (Spoor & Kelly, 2004.)

By definition, group mood is conceived of as the composition of individual moods of the members within the group; group mood occurs across the aggregate and affects the individuals within the group (Spoor & Kelly, 2004.) Researchers interested in group affect must make a distinction between homogenous affect or heterogeneous affect; homogenous affect occurring when individuals’ affect within the group is similar and heterogeneous affect occurring when individuals’ affect within the group is distinctly different (Spoor & Kelly, 2004.) However, no preference is given to either scenario, both combinations are equally important in an evolutionary perspective. It is widely accepted that emotions serve functions (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000), specifically social functions (Nesse, 1990) in order to express information to others (Ekman, 1993.) Spoor and Kelly (2004) propose that emotions and moods provide a quick and effective method to coordinate group members’ behavior and goals. Within a group, a system that swiftly transmits affective information, especially information about the environment, would have provided a great advantage in survival (Spoor & Kelly, 2004.)  The authors propose explicit affect regulation is the mechanism that successfully accomplishes this goal. Emotional contagion, such as mimicry and synchrony, serve to converge affect across group members, creating a homogenous affective group state (Spoor & Kelly, 2004.) Just as you imitate the body language of a person you are romantically attracted to in order to advertise this attraction, mimicry in groups can serve as a way to transmit your current affective states to others, even automatically, with minimal effort. The transmission of negative affect would be very important in the EEA, and thus would occur more rapidly in order for survival (Joiner, 1994.) Communicating your noticing of a lion lurking in the nearby brush without explicit vocalization or dramatic motor movements would be quite vital to survival. This rapid transmission of negative affect can also have deleterious effects in today’s society as well: one individual’s experience of dissent or dissatisfaction can transmit across the entire group, sometimes unconsciously, bringing about dissent or dissatisfaction across the aggregate. Albeit, this explicit regulation of negative affect served more benefits to survival in the EEA.

Another benefit of explicit affect regulation within a group would be affect’s ability to communicate status and rank within a group: low moods signaling low status, high moods signaling high status (Nesse, 1991.) Houser and Lovaglia (2002) proposed that affect and status interactions occur in a specific pattern: high status group members will exhibit positive affect frequently, while low status members exhibit negative affect frequently. The group as a whole would profit from “developing affect regulation strategies that maintain appropriate levels of affect for certain group members,” particularly the affect of low status members (Spoor & Kelly, 2004, p. 404.) This status hierarchy is maintained via heterogeneous affect within the group. Spoor and Kelly (2004) hypothesized that once status hierarchies are formed, they are quite persistent, resulting from the hard work of high status individuals to maintain the group’s bonds and survival benefits; remaining in this successful group, even as a low status individual, would outweigh the selfish interests to dissent and leave. This function of heterogeneous affect within a group is supported by empirical evidence. Tidens et al. (2000) discovered that high status individuals would experience pride in response to a positive outcome and anger in response to a negative outcome; likewise, low status individuals would experience gratitude in response to positive outcomes and sadness in response to negative outcomes.

This research regarding status hierarchies and group affect has serious implications for self-esteem and affect regulation research. As Wood, Heimpel, and Michela (2003) revealed that individuals with low self-esteem are likely to dampen positive affect, individuals with high self-esteem are likely to savor positive affect. This theory could have direct correlations to the utility of group affect on status hierarchies, suggesting there are more than just hedonic regulation preferences being exhibited by low self-esteem individuals. Those with low self-esteem might not wish to threaten their position of low rank by gloating about their positive event, which could anger individuals higher in status, and potentially result in their dismissal from the successful group. Even more so, this dampening of positive affect by low-self esteem individuals could be the result of implicit processing resulting from a potential genetic disposition to be low in status rank. Consistent with Tiedens et al.’s (2000) findings, Heimpel, Wood, Marshall, and Brown (2002) also found that individuals low in self-esteem following a negative life event are not likely to repair their mood, and instead express sadness. The statement made by Heimpel et al. (2002): “in some cases, [low self-esteem] people respond in ways that seem particularly maladaptive” could be refuted through examination of the utility of group affect on status hierarchies. Like any great inspirational speech before a championship game, effectively regulating affect within a group prior to collective activities helps communicate a desired unified group outcome (Spoor & Kelly, 2004.) In total, explicit affect regulation within a group functions to alert positive and negative environmental cues and maintain status hierarchies; a successful adaptation to an unyielding EEA.

The second function of shared affect within groups proposed by Spoor and Kelly (2004) is the facilitation of bonds between members of the group. It is this shared affect that is thought to attract individuals to the group at the beginning and what keeps them loyal throughout (Brewer, 1997.)   Since negative group affect regulation is closely related to survival situations and communication, positive group affect regulation serves a bonding function (Spoor & Kelly, 2004.) Both of these two functions of group affect lead to the most successful surviving and reproducing humans. “Our current affective experiences in groups were likely shaped by an evolutionary history that favored a functional role for affect and affect regulation mechanisms in groups” (Spoor & Kelly, 2004, p. 409.) It is this research within evolutionary psychology that provides answers to questions regarding the ultimate purpose of human function, even if the proximate purpose of that function seems disorderly, dysfunctional, or lacking any genuine purpose. Looking at affect regulation research through the evolutionary psychology lens might provide insights otherwise missed previously. The above definitely highlights the importance of collaboration across these fronts, since a more cohesive structured explanation of affect regulation could arise. Finally, an important pillar of evolutionary psychology is the examination of sex differences within human psychological functioning. Since sexual dimorphism is a product of natural selection, it is natural to believe sex differences also exist in the realm of affective regulation, even if current methodology within the field have not yet tapped into these differences.

Sex differences and Affect Regulation

It has only been recently accepted that males and females evolved specific expressive methods for communicating and interacting with same-sex individuals (Vigil, 2007.)  It could also be postulated that men and women evolved separate affect regulation and expression behaviors (Vigil, 2008.) A Socio-Relational Framework of Expressive Behaviors (SRFB; Vigil, 2008) has been proposed to explain the variation in the expression of affect behaviors by two primary dimensions: basic and reciprocity potential. Basic motivations of expression in behavior come from our reptilian brain: approach or avoid environmental stimuli (Vigil, 2008.) Humans, with the cognitive capacity to evaluate the cost and benefits of each situation encountered, display affiliative responses and emotions when encountering a situation perceived to be reciprocated or display avoidant responses and emotions when a situation has the potential to not be reciprocated (Vigil, 2008.) For example, if you come across an attractive other of the opposite sex, joy and happiness is expressed (emotions that promote bonding); if you come across a hostile individual, anger and fear are expressed (emotions that promote distancing.) The reciprocity potential conveys information regarding capacity or trustworthiness of the interaction with another individual; capacity being either to help or hurt others, while trustworthiness being the probability of actually reciprocating altruism (Vigil, 2008.) With that being said, humans should evolved sensitivity to cues of capacity and trustworthiness and convey this same information accurately to others in order to form fitness improving relationships with other humans (Vigil, 2008.)  

Sex differences in affect expression behavior is due to the sex differences in relationship dynamics, formed throughout human’s evolutionary history (Vigil, 2008.) The male-male coalitional competition dictates that males tend to remain in close proximity to their male-kin, while females are forced to migrate into the social networks formed by these related males coalition (Geary et al., 2002.) From this system, males would interact with kin regularly while females interact with non-kin. As previously stated, human interactions between non-kin is driven by reciprocal altruism; females must seek and secure relationships among non-kin and do this by displaying submissiveness or weakness and pacification or compassion (Vigil, 2008.) This signaling by females conveys their trustworthiness, a facet of this reciprocity potential, non-verbally and effectively, in turn allowing for greater allocation of investment in these relationships (Vigil, 2008.) In contrast, since kin surrounds males regularly, this expression of weakness and compassion in order to allocate resources is unnecessary. Instead, males engage in expressive behaviors that advertise the capacity component of this reciprocal potential; advertising dominance, aggression, and elaborate motor movements are examples of dominant behavior (Vigil, 2008.) Empirically this has been supported as well, Vigil (2008) found higher displays of physical aggression in males and crying behaviors in females indicative of the aforementioned selective advantage in affective signaling behaviors. Males express elevated levels of aggression to influence peers to distance themselves and display their still present ability to protect themselves during stressful events (Vigil, 2008.) It could be said that this dominant display of aggression can also lead others to affiliate with the male in the future while deterring other dangerous males from interacting with the male (Vigil, 2008.) Furthermore, males are more capable of perceiving the desired social outcomes of other males, while females are more perceptive to the desired social outcomes of female expressions than males (Vigil, 2008.) That is, when a man sees a female crying, his immediate, implicit response is to distance himself from her rather than provide comfort; likewise, a female that saw this display of distress would want to affiliate with and provide comfort to her. From this, it can be concluded that nonverbal affect behaviors evolved predominantly to communicate with same-sex peers (Vigil, 2008.)

This knowledge could be tremendously useful in research of affect expressive behaviors: having males evaluate distress behaviors of the opposite sex might not be as fruitful as having males evaluate behaviors of the same sex. This also has implications for our understanding of emotional intelligence and individual differences in affect regulation. For example, Wilkowski and Robinson (2008) declared that emotional clarity resulted in reductions of anger: individuals more capable of identifying an undesirable affective state would down regulate this state quickly and effectively. Females who, as determined above, do not express aggression in response to distress but instead express affiliative behaviors dominate their sample. The majority of females within the sample would prefer to down regulate anger quickly, since it promotes distancing. This emotional clarity might intrinsically possess a sex bias: anger, as used by males in stressful situations to promote the adaptive strategy of distancing and protection, might not be down regulated by males, or seen as undesirable, which incorrectly implies they lack emotional clarity. This also could explain why men seem to suppress emotions that would convey submissiveness, vulnerability, or weakness (see Gross & John, 2003.) Men might be more inclined to not express their current emotion state, dependent upon who they are surrounded by (kin or non-kin), what current state they are in (positive or negative), and their current social goal (affiliate or avoidant.) Examining these sex differences is crucial in painting the whole picture of affect regulation strategies. This seemingly deleterious act of social avoidance today might have posed a selective advantage in our evolutionary past; understanding these mechanisms might provide insight and allow for clinical implementation. Incorporation of sex differences into our already fervent study of individual differences in affect regulation would be fruitful.

 Lastly, these sex differences in affect expression could be rooted in neuroendocrine mechanisms that are distinct in males and females (Vigil, 2008.) While males might operate on the Fight or Flight mechanism of the sympathetic nervous system, females might operate on the Tend and Befriend mechanism (Taylor, 2006.) An affiliative neurocircuitry has been found that promotes affiliation in response to stress (Taylor, 2006); it would be obvious that this system is dominant in females, whose evolutionary past surrounded by non-kin promoted this behavior to secure resources. This Tend and Befriend response to stress is heavily dependent on oxytocin, a hormone that is endogenously high in females (Taylor, 2002.) This expression of sadness resulted in increased assistance from affiliates throughout our evolutionary past, thus increasing the utility and occurrence of this affect display in females still today. In a study on the value of tears, as the result of crying, tears communicate sadness and sincerity; these tears in adulthood serve to mobilize emotional support (Ziefman & Brown, 2011.) These visual cues of distress are reliable and not easily suppressed (Ziefman & Brown, 2011), especially when we know that this outward expression of distress can be voluntarily suppressed or exaggerated (Fridlund, 1994.) As Hackenbracht and Tamir (2010) established, sadness was found to be useful when looking to elicit help; however, they failed to include sex differences in these preferences within their analyses. It would be expected that females preferred to elicit sadness more so than males and consequently, females would be more adept at doing so. Future research in regard to the utility of sadness, or aggression, should include how males and females might differ on the emotion they prefer to elicit and within what context.

These expressions of aggression and crying in males and females, respectively, in response to distress are effective at causing others to avoid or affiliate (Vigil, 2008.) Supporting the notion that effective affect regulation is adaptive, especially when used to optimize an individual’s social network in order to promote healing and recovery from an adverse experience (Vigil, 2008.) In conclusion, it should be noted that nonverbal affect behaviors are specialized across the sexes and effective, thus consequently adaptive (Vigil, 2008); this reasoning should be attended to when researching differences in affect regulation strategies.

Limitations and Future Directions

            As with all endeavors, limitations infiltrate great intentions. As humans evolved the ability to control evolved preferences through effortful control and the evaluation of infinite cost and benefits, however, our expansive culture bombards our human brains with information that might compete with our ability to control automatic processing (MacDonald, 2008.) The constant exposure to the media expands our immediate existence to encompass the existence of people that we otherwise would never meet or see. The mere exposure to supermodel level attractive females might not have occurred early in our evolutionary past, which in turn clouds our ability to rate prospective female mates that are encountered daily. Suddenly, the average male finds no mate sufficient enough in attractiveness (in comparison to these supermodels) and thus does not mate; this comes as a consequence of evolution not directly programming humans with a proximal mechanism that increases fitness (MacDonald, 2008.) As a result, uncertainty lies between what is deemed as success from an evolutionary standpoint and human psychology (MacDonald, 2008.) 

            The human emotions being deemed useful and shaped by natural selection is something that has taken quite some time to become accepted, especially when human psychological adaptations are not as clear-cut and obvious like a turtle’s shell or a tiger’s stripes. The limitation to seeing affective regulation as an adaptation is the lack of evidence directly pinning affective regulation as an output of natural selection. These inferences are made inherently, primarily through speculative efforts; however, this gap is slowly being closed and it could be proposed that future work in affect regulation will incorporate evolutionary theory in order to understand the proximate and ultimate purposes behind effective and adaptive regulation.

            As Spoor and Kelly (2004) eloquently stated, “evolutionary psychology has the potential to provide a unifying theory for understanding many of the disparate phenomena in psychology” (pg. 409.) Just as research in emotions benefited from an evolutionary perspective, affect regulation will benefit wholly from incorporating the theory of evolution into future research endeavors. Hopefully soon, the use of the term adaptive within affect regulation literature will be clearly defined and universally understood. The distinctions between effective and adaptive regulation will be a thing of the past; future researchers will no longer err in their classification (see Campos, Walle, Dahl, & Main, 2011.) With that being said, the instrumental model of emotion regulation might be most accepting of incorporating evolutionary theory; as Tamir (2011) alluded to, an emotion that is adaptive in one context might not be adaptive in another and “social context in which regulation takes place” must be acknowledged (pg. 4.)

            Furthermore, research into group affect and affect regulation through an evolutionary lens might prove to be beneficial, even to others outside the immediate realm of evolutionary psychology and affect regulation. For example, it has been shown that emotional contagion of negative affect might prove to be quite useful, as it brings awareness to negative aspects of a work environment, which in turn motivates change (Spoor & Kelly, 2004.) This research into group affect regulation might help shed light on individuals’ affective regulation, since group affect is comprised of each individual’s current affective state. When a regulatory strategy seems not adaptive at the singular level, perhaps examining this strategy at a group level might reveal intentions. Being aware of the utility of emotion to communicate hierarchy status, this might shed light on the previously perceived non-adaptive regulation as an individual with low self-esteem not celebrating alone at home after receiving an A on a final exam. The emotion regulation properties of the status hierarchy have been previously identified: an individual is influenced by affective signals from others and consequently, these individuals seek out environments that facilitate regulation (Sloman, Atkinson, Milligan, & Liotti, 2002.) This could explain why low self-esteem individuals seek to maintain this low status, not only as self-verification but since they regulate most effectively within their current status hierarchy; moving social groups might result in a disruption of their current status, either positively or negatively, and would result in dysregulation. This evolutionary perspective can consequently reframe low self-esteem as being a positive adaptive function to avoid conflict (Sloman, Atkinson, Milligan, & Liotti, 2002.)

Moreover, understanding how psychological mechanisms evolved can provide clinical insights and improvements. Since happiness is not the normal state of functioning but rather, a goal to which we all strive, provides inspiration to alleviate our current discomfort, and thus consequently continue to improve our fitness (Nesse, 1990.) An evolutionary perspective provides much needed insight to the realm of emotional disorders. Recognizing that we have negative affective experiences for good reasons (to defend against situations that might decrease fitness), clinicians should look at the current life situation of the individual experiencing this negative affect (Nesse, 1990.) Understanding the goals of the individual, what strategies are being used to accomplish those goals, and their ability to achieve that goal might contribute to the possibility of an emotional disorder being present (Nesse, 1990.) Although these defensive responses to events seem to be over responsive, exaggerated, and unbearable, understanding the evolutionary functions of the emotion will allow us to lessen our once normal and superiorly adaptive, but superfluous emotional afflictions (Nesse, 1990.) Concluding, future research should aim to establish what kinds of suffering can or can not be relieved without compromising an adaptation, and this can only be accomplished through scrutinization of the evolutionary functions of emotions (Nesse, 1990.) “Knowledge of the underlying biology [of psychological mechanisms] informs the integration of art and science” (Sloman, Atkinson, Milligan, & Liotti, 2002, pg. 324.)

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