Evolutionary
Explanations of Affect Regulation
Evolutionary Psychology
The theory of evolution by natural
selection was recognized over 150 years ago (Darwin, 1859). It has only been in
the past 20 years that psychological, social, and behavior sciences have began
to integrate the principles already deeply incorporated in biology and ecology.
The goal of evolutionary psychology is not only to incorporate evolutionary
biology, anthropology, neuroscience, and cognitive psychology to map human
nature but also to rewrite existing literature, framing previous efforts into
this perspective (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992.) It is worth mentioning that
evolutionary psychology is not to be acknowledged as a subset of psychology,
like social psychology or cognitive psychology, but rather “a way of thinking
about psychology” available as a lens for viewing any topic therein (Cosmides
& Tooby, 2000. Pg 1.)
Emotions
Emotions, and the theory surrounding
them, were some of the first constructs Tooby and Cosmides examined when
looking to apply their concepts and methods to cognitive science (Tooby, 1985;
Tooby & Cosmides, 1990.) The acceptance and prevalent use of the
evolutionary explanation of emotions has been long withstanding. Emotions are
super-ordinate programs, when activated by a recurrent adaptive problem,
activate and deactivate a multitude of cognitive components, which guide the
organism to an outcome promoting reproduction, thus increasing fitness
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2000.) Emotions influence
goals, prioritize motivation, prompt information gathering, impose a conceptual
framework, alter perception, affect memory, direct attention, mobilize
physiology, and facilitate communication (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000.) Emotions
can influence behavior, specialize inferential thinking, stimulate reflexes,
promote learning, color events, determine effort allocation, recalibrate
current experience, alter infinite outcomes of behaviors, and propel culture
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2000.)
Affect
Regulation
Affect regulation is defined as the
things we do to influence which emotions we experience, when we experience
them, and how we experience and express them (Gross, 1998.) Affect regulation
is primarily referred to as a diverse set of processes by which emotions are
regulated (Gross, 1999.) Important to this discussion is the other function of
affect regulation: how individuals influence their own emotions and how these
influence other’s emotions (Gross, 1999.)
It is through this mechanism of regulation that emotions co-evolved with
to convey information about an individual’s state to others (Cosmides &
Tooby, 2000.) Being able to effectively regulate your current emotions in order
to communicate your internal state would be necessary in order to successfully
survive and reproduce. In particular, evolutionary psychology helps clarify the
goals of affective regulation, especially when the current environment is
dramatically different from the environment to which these emotions and
mechanisms to regulate them evolved (Gross, 1999.) These evolutionarily relevant
goals range from evading a predator to selecting a successful mate. It is
commonly understood that these archaic emotions prompt responses that are
useless, appraisals that are a waste of time, or responses that are conflicting
with important goals (Gross, 1999.)
However, this is a common misunderstanding. Painful states or
overzealous responses to stress are evolved defense patterns that proved to be
invaluable in our evolutionary past, just as much as the cough of a pneumatic
(Nesse, 1990.) Defective regulation of affect causes suffering, more than just
anxiety, sadness, or anger. It is this evolutionary perspective that allows an
understanding of these regulatory mechanisms in an ultimate sense, independent
of their misunderstood proximate reasons. When looking to understand the
mechanisms of an emotion, even one that seems not adaptive such as anxiety, it
is best to look at the cognitive and physiological mechanisms that regulate
that emotion (Nesse, 1990.) Emotion, the cues that elicit them, and the
resulting regulatory behaviors are different in cultures and individuals, but
in no way does this undercut an evolutionary approach (Nesse, 1990.) The
tool-box hypothesis was formed by natural selection: “far more useful than
fixed patterns of response are patterns and regulatory mechanisms that adjust
to the needs of the current environment;” it is natural selection that makes
this flexibility possible (Nesse, 1990, pg. 280.) For example, our current environment would
establish that guns, cars, and electrical outlets are dangerous and should
elicit an appropriate amount of fear, while in the EEA heights, darkness, and
spiders posed dangerous threats and induced fear; conditioning the former
requires great effort (Nesse, 1990.) Consequently, natural selection doesn’t
necessitate rigid patterns of response: instead it shaped a tendency to
establish certain avoidance reactions and the capacity to modify these
responses to our current environment (Nesse, 1990.)
The ability to regulate affect
voluntarily arises from several cortical regions, most developed within the
human species. The anterior cingulated
cortex (ACC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC), and prefrontal cortex (PFC) are thought to be the neural correlates of
affect regulation (for review, Beer & Lombardo, 2005.) In regards to affect
generation, detection, and attention direction the amygdala has been found to
be responsible (Lieberman et al., 2007.)
Effortful Control and Affect Regulation
Evidence in the field of cognitive
neuroscience has established that there are two distinct forms of cognitive
processing: implicit and explicit. Implicit cognitive systems are outside
consciousness, automatic, swift, effortless, and an adaptation from evolution;
explicit cognitive systems are conscious, controllable, slow, limited,
effortful, and acquired through culture (MacDonald, 2008). Implicit processing
is recruited reflexively when encountering evolutionarily relevant stimuli;
explicit processing is recruited when confronted with a situation that is
novel, requiring flexibility and planning of response (MacDonald, 2008).
Conflict arises when one must exert control over implicit processes; this can
occur in two domains: cognitive (deemed executive function) and socioaffective
(deemed effortful control) (MacDonald, 2008). Through time, however, implicit
affective adaptations are subject to being controlled by the explicit
processing mechanisms (MacDonald, 2008.) This arose as a consequence of our
newfound ability to think ahead, examine information that is not evolutionarily
recurrent, and weigh costs and benefits of our behavioral outcomes (MacDonald,
2008).
This effortful control is what we know as
affect regulation. Whether or not a man utilizes aggression (successfully down-regulation
of aggression) toward his romantic rival rests upon his ability to evaluate the
potential costs and benefits of his action; the conflict lies within his
ability to override the implicit processing (desire for revenge) with explicit
processing (fear of prison) (MacDonald, 2008.)
Not only are these behavioral examples indicative of the overlap between
effortful control and affect regulation, but research on human brain evolution
also indicates this overlap. Affective states, consequence of implicit
processing, like fear in a dangerous situation, arise through pathways directly
from the amygdala (LeDoux, 2000) while explicit processing is seated in the
prefrontal cortex (PFC) (MacDonald, 2008). Neuropsychological research has also
placed affective regulation in the PFC (Beer & Lombardo, 2007; Davison,
Fox, & Kalin, 2007; Lieberman et al., 2007; and Phan et al., 2005.) The
overlap of these prefrontal cortex regions are indicative of how the ability to
weigh costs and benefits of behavioral outcomes would lead to an increase in
fitness. In socioaffective control literature the VMFPC, OFC, and ventral ACC
are implicated (MacDonald, 2008). Damage to the OFC, DLPFC, VMPFC, and ACC in
humans is indicative of regulatory and effortful control dysfunction (for
review, Beer & Lombardo, 2005.) Activation in these cortical areas serves
to inhibit activation in other areas, specifically the OFC (Beer &
Lombardo, 2007; and MacDonald, 2008.) Individuals that exhibit low effortful
control also have lower ability at regulation of negative affect. This alludes
to the consistent overlap between effortful control and affect regulation;
giving rise to the necessity of consolidation of investigative efforts.
This significant overlap in literature
signals the necessity for evolutionary psychology to be then lens to which
affective regulation researchers look through. For example, the often held
notion as disruptive and unnecessary reflexive leap backward at the sight of a
snake is merely an installment of evolutionary design; in a situation where to
err is fatal, this reflex is to prevent the organism from potential harm, while
the slow, explicit processing of the actual curved stick reveals its true self.
Research on implicit and explicit methods of affect regulation is relatively
recent (Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011.) This explicit processing is critical
to adaptive function and thus adaptive affect regulation. MacDonald (2008)
proposed that the prefrontal mechanisms of effortful control are generally to
inhibit short-term gains in return for long-term payoffs. This exact statement
can be rephrased in terminology seen in affect regulation literature: the
prefrontal mechanisms act non-hedonically, instead operating in favor of
utilitarian regulation motives (see Tamir, Chiu, & Gross, 2007.) This
captures the necessity for collaboration of evolutionary psychologists and
affect psychologists to provide a better and comprehensive understanding of the
emotions and the regulatory strategies utilized to govern them. However, why we
evolved this affect regulation ability has been answered, but to serve what
purpose? Humans are not only emotional animals, but social animals as well.
The
Social Emotions and Affect Regulation
Interactions between people are the
result of two mechanisms: kin selection and reciprocal altruism (Nesse, 1990.)
Kin selection operates upon Hamilton’s rule: where the genetic relatedness of
the recipient is multiplied by the reproductive benefit gained by the
recipient, this being greater than the reproductive cost incurred on the giver
(Nesse, 1990.) The more genetic material you share with someone, the more
likely you are to help him or her. Reciprocal altruism operates upon
cooperation with individuals that probably don’t share genetic material with
you (Nesse, 1990.) The prisoner’s dilemma game is utilized when trying to
explain the benefits of cooperation between individuals: constant cooperation
yields the maximum long-term benefits for both players and thus is the optimal
result of the game. Reciprocal relationships are human pattern interactions
that occur daily: from giving a friend a ride to school to lending them a
substantial amount of money. Social emotions function within these reciprocal
relationships: individuals that constantly cooperate experience friendship,
love, obligation, and pride; individuals that constantly defect experience
rejection and hatred; and individuals that defect when one cooperates
experience anger, anxiety, and guilt (Nesse, 1990.)
The social emotions serve adaptive
functions through a multitude of avenues. The positive emotions elicited by
constant cooperation act as mediators of commitment (Nesse, 1990.) The negative
emotions elicited when the other person defects when you cooperate, such as
anger, serve adaptive purposes (Nesse, 1990.) Affect regulation research has
revealed that negative affect, such as anger, is preferred when preparing for
confrontation (Tamir & Ford, 2009.) This can also be said of someone that
was recently betrayed in a reciprocal relationship: anger is a signal that the
defection has been detected and is not tolerated in the future by that
individual (Nesse, 1990.) Any potential defector will be less likely to defect
against the individual that effectively displays anger and more likely to
cooperate upon future interactions. Anxiety also serves an adaptive purpose, as
it motivates cooperation even when the interaction is least desirable (Nesse,
1990.) This anxiety is reflected in the non-hedonic preferences of individuals
when addressing self-relevant goals: such as confronting an individual that has
compromised your reciprocal relationship (Tamir and Ford, 2009.) Although
helping a younger sibling study for an exam on a Friday night seems unpleasant,
the anxiety that the impending exam elicits motivates the individual away from
immediate pleasure (inebriation) and instead towards the long-term payoff
(future cooperation.) It is this ability to cooperate between two individuals
that lead to the formation of small groups over the course of human evolution.
The necessity for survival and reproduction within small groups serve as the
purpose for effortful control and for adaptive social emotions.
Affect Regulation in Groups
Early in the course of human evolution,
in order to successfully survive and reproduce, one must be within a small
group of cooperating individuals (Buss & Kenrick, 1998.) This strategy
leads to the greatest benefits in reproduction and thus favored by natural
selection. The interactions among these smalls groups, along with the moods and
emotions experienced in these groups, are essential to human life; studying the
cause and effect of affect within a group is becoming increasingly interesting
to researchers (Spoor & Kelly, 2004.) Spoor and Kelly (2004) proposed “the
experience of shared affective states within groups, as well as specific
mechanisms to regulate and maintain certain affective states in groups,
developed because of their adaptive value within the context of group living”
(Spoor & Kelly, 2004, p. 398.) Since the early environment of evolutionary
adaptedness forced humans to living in small groups, and the structure within
these groups limited by kin selection and reciprocal altruism, it is important
to study the affect experience of these individuals in order to better understand
emotions and the regulation of them today. The problem of cooperation would
have been the primary adaptive problem for humans, especially since groups
often included members that might not share genetic material with each other
directly (Brewer, 1997.) It is postulated that the development of moods and
emotions in groups serves as the driving force that coordinates group activity
through the communication of information among the group and facilitation of
group bonds (Spoor & Kelly, 2004.)
By definition, group mood is conceived of
as the composition of individual moods of the members within the group; group
mood occurs across the aggregate and affects the individuals within the group
(Spoor & Kelly, 2004.) Researchers interested in group affect must make a
distinction between homogenous affect or heterogeneous affect; homogenous
affect occurring when individuals’ affect within the group is similar and
heterogeneous affect occurring when individuals’ affect within the group is
distinctly different (Spoor & Kelly, 2004.) However, no preference is given
to either scenario, both combinations are equally important in an evolutionary
perspective. It is widely accepted that emotions serve functions (Cosmides
& Tooby, 2000), specifically social functions (Nesse, 1990) in order to
express information to others (Ekman, 1993.) Spoor and Kelly (2004) propose
that emotions and moods provide a quick and effective method to coordinate
group members’ behavior and goals. Within a group, a system that swiftly
transmits affective information, especially information about the environment,
would have provided a great advantage in survival (Spoor & Kelly,
2004.) The authors propose explicit
affect regulation is the mechanism that successfully accomplishes this goal.
Emotional contagion, such as mimicry and synchrony, serve to converge affect
across group members, creating a homogenous affective group state (Spoor &
Kelly, 2004.) Just as you imitate the body language of a person you are
romantically attracted to in order to advertise this attraction, mimicry in
groups can serve as a way to transmit your current affective states to others,
even automatically, with minimal effort. The transmission of negative affect
would be very important in the EEA, and thus would occur more rapidly in order
for survival (Joiner, 1994.) Communicating your noticing of a lion lurking in
the nearby brush without explicit vocalization or dramatic motor movements
would be quite vital to survival. This rapid transmission of negative affect
can also have deleterious effects in today’s society as well: one individual’s
experience of dissent or dissatisfaction can transmit across the entire group,
sometimes unconsciously, bringing about dissent or dissatisfaction across the
aggregate. Albeit, this explicit regulation of negative affect served more
benefits to survival in the EEA.
Another benefit of explicit affect
regulation within a group would be affect’s ability to communicate status and
rank within a group: low moods signaling low status, high moods signaling high
status (Nesse, 1991.) Houser and Lovaglia (2002) proposed that affect and
status interactions occur in a specific pattern: high status group members will
exhibit positive affect frequently, while low status members exhibit negative
affect frequently. The group as a whole would profit from “developing affect
regulation strategies that maintain appropriate levels of affect for certain
group members,” particularly the affect of low status members (Spoor &
Kelly, 2004, p. 404.) This status hierarchy is maintained via heterogeneous
affect within the group. Spoor and Kelly (2004) hypothesized that once status
hierarchies are formed, they are quite persistent, resulting from the hard work
of high status individuals to maintain the group’s bonds and survival benefits;
remaining in this successful group, even as a low status individual, would
outweigh the selfish interests to dissent and leave. This function of
heterogeneous affect within a group is supported by empirical evidence. Tidens
et al. (2000) discovered that high status individuals would experience pride in
response to a positive outcome and anger in response to a negative outcome;
likewise, low status individuals would experience gratitude in response to
positive outcomes and sadness in response to negative outcomes.
This research regarding status
hierarchies and group affect has serious implications for self-esteem and
affect regulation research. As Wood, Heimpel, and Michela (2003) revealed that
individuals with low self-esteem are likely to dampen positive affect,
individuals with high self-esteem are likely to savor positive affect. This
theory could have direct correlations to the utility of group affect on status
hierarchies, suggesting there are more than just hedonic regulation preferences
being exhibited by low self-esteem individuals. Those with low self-esteem
might not wish to threaten their position of low rank by gloating about their
positive event, which could anger individuals higher in status, and potentially
result in their dismissal from the successful group. Even more so, this
dampening of positive affect by low-self esteem individuals could be the result
of implicit processing resulting from a potential genetic disposition to be low
in status rank. Consistent with Tiedens et al.’s (2000) findings, Heimpel,
Wood, Marshall, and Brown (2002) also found that individuals low in self-esteem
following a negative life event are not likely to repair their mood, and
instead express sadness. The statement made by Heimpel et al. (2002): “in some
cases, [low self-esteem] people respond in ways that seem particularly
maladaptive” could be refuted through examination of the utility of group
affect on status hierarchies. Like any great inspirational speech before a
championship game, effectively regulating affect within a group prior to
collective activities helps communicate a desired unified group outcome (Spoor
& Kelly, 2004.) In total, explicit affect regulation within a group
functions to alert positive and negative environmental cues and maintain status
hierarchies; a successful adaptation to an unyielding EEA.
The second function of shared affect
within groups proposed by Spoor and Kelly (2004) is the facilitation of bonds
between members of the group. It is this shared affect that is thought to
attract individuals to the group at the beginning and what keeps them loyal
throughout (Brewer, 1997.) Since
negative group affect regulation is closely related to survival situations and
communication, positive group affect regulation serves a bonding function
(Spoor & Kelly, 2004.) Both of these two functions of group affect lead to
the most successful surviving and reproducing humans. “Our current affective
experiences in groups were likely shaped by an evolutionary history that
favored a functional role for affect and affect regulation mechanisms in
groups” (Spoor & Kelly, 2004, p. 409.) It is this research within
evolutionary psychology that provides answers to questions regarding the
ultimate purpose of human function, even if the proximate purpose of that
function seems disorderly, dysfunctional, or lacking any genuine purpose.
Looking at affect regulation research through the evolutionary psychology lens
might provide insights otherwise missed previously. The above definitely
highlights the importance of collaboration across these fronts, since a more
cohesive structured explanation of affect regulation could arise. Finally, an
important pillar of evolutionary psychology is the examination of sex
differences within human psychological functioning. Since sexual dimorphism is
a product of natural selection, it is natural to believe sex differences also
exist in the realm of affective regulation, even if current methodology within
the field have not yet tapped into these differences.
Sex
differences and Affect Regulation
It has only been recently accepted that
males and females evolved specific expressive methods for communicating and
interacting with same-sex individuals (Vigil, 2007.) It could also be postulated that men and
women evolved separate affect regulation and expression behaviors (Vigil,
2008.) A Socio-Relational Framework of Expressive Behaviors (SRFB; Vigil, 2008)
has been proposed to explain the variation in the expression of affect
behaviors by two primary dimensions: basic and reciprocity potential. Basic
motivations of expression in behavior come from our reptilian brain: approach
or avoid environmental stimuli (Vigil, 2008.) Humans, with the cognitive
capacity to evaluate the cost and benefits of each situation encountered,
display affiliative responses and emotions when encountering a situation
perceived to be reciprocated or display avoidant responses and emotions when a
situation has the potential to not be reciprocated (Vigil, 2008.) For example,
if you come across an attractive other of the opposite sex, joy and happiness
is expressed (emotions that promote bonding); if you come across a hostile
individual, anger and fear are expressed (emotions that promote distancing.)
The reciprocity potential conveys information regarding capacity or
trustworthiness of the interaction with another individual; capacity being
either to help or hurt others, while trustworthiness being the probability of
actually reciprocating altruism (Vigil, 2008.) With that being said, humans
should evolved sensitivity to cues of capacity and trustworthiness and convey
this same information accurately to others in order to form fitness improving
relationships with other humans (Vigil, 2008.)
Sex differences in affect expression
behavior is due to the sex differences in relationship dynamics, formed
throughout human’s evolutionary history (Vigil, 2008.) The male-male
coalitional competition dictates that males tend to remain in close proximity
to their male-kin, while females are forced to migrate into the social networks
formed by these related males coalition (Geary et al., 2002.) From this system,
males would interact with kin regularly while females interact with non-kin. As
previously stated, human interactions between non-kin is driven by reciprocal
altruism; females must seek and secure relationships among non-kin and do this
by displaying submissiveness or weakness and pacification or compassion (Vigil,
2008.) This signaling by females conveys their trustworthiness, a facet of this
reciprocity potential, non-verbally and effectively, in turn allowing for
greater allocation of investment in these relationships (Vigil, 2008.) In
contrast, since kin surrounds males regularly, this expression of weakness and
compassion in order to allocate resources is unnecessary. Instead, males engage
in expressive behaviors that advertise the capacity component of this
reciprocal potential; advertising dominance, aggression, and elaborate motor
movements are examples of dominant behavior (Vigil, 2008.) Empirically this has
been supported as well, Vigil (2008) found higher displays of physical
aggression in males and crying behaviors in females indicative of the
aforementioned selective advantage in affective signaling behaviors. Males
express elevated levels of aggression to influence peers to distance themselves
and display their still present ability to protect themselves during stressful
events (Vigil, 2008.) It could be said that this dominant display of aggression
can also lead others to affiliate with the male in the future while deterring
other dangerous males from interacting with the male (Vigil, 2008.)
Furthermore, males are more capable of perceiving the desired social outcomes
of other males, while females are more perceptive to the desired social
outcomes of female expressions than males (Vigil, 2008.) That is, when a man
sees a female crying, his immediate, implicit response is to distance himself
from her rather than provide comfort; likewise, a female that saw this display
of distress would want to affiliate with and provide comfort to her. From this,
it can be concluded that nonverbal affect behaviors evolved predominantly to
communicate with same-sex peers (Vigil, 2008.)
This knowledge could be tremendously
useful in research of affect expressive behaviors: having males evaluate
distress behaviors of the opposite sex might not be as fruitful as having males
evaluate behaviors of the same sex. This also has implications for our
understanding of emotional intelligence and individual differences in affect
regulation. For example, Wilkowski and Robinson (2008) declared that emotional
clarity resulted in reductions of anger: individuals more capable of
identifying an undesirable affective state would down regulate this state
quickly and effectively. Females who, as determined above, do not express
aggression in response to distress but instead express affiliative behaviors
dominate their sample. The majority of females within the sample would prefer
to down regulate anger quickly, since it promotes distancing. This emotional
clarity might intrinsically possess a sex bias: anger, as used by males in
stressful situations to promote the adaptive strategy of distancing and
protection, might not be down regulated by males, or seen as undesirable, which
incorrectly implies they lack emotional clarity. This also could explain why
men seem to suppress emotions that would convey submissiveness, vulnerability,
or weakness (see Gross & John, 2003.) Men might be more inclined to not
express their current emotion state, dependent upon who they are surrounded by
(kin or non-kin), what current state they are in (positive or negative), and
their current social goal (affiliate or avoidant.) Examining these sex
differences is crucial in painting the whole picture of affect regulation strategies.
This seemingly deleterious act of social avoidance today might have posed a
selective advantage in our evolutionary past; understanding these mechanisms
might provide insight and allow for clinical implementation. Incorporation of
sex differences into our already fervent study of individual differences in
affect regulation would be fruitful.
Lastly, these sex differences in affect
expression could be rooted in neuroendocrine mechanisms that are distinct in
males and females (Vigil, 2008.) While males might operate on the Fight or
Flight mechanism of the sympathetic nervous system, females might operate on
the Tend and Befriend mechanism (Taylor, 2006.) An affiliative neurocircuitry
has been found that promotes affiliation in response to stress (Taylor, 2006);
it would be obvious that this system is dominant in females, whose evolutionary
past surrounded by non-kin promoted this behavior to secure resources. This
Tend and Befriend response to stress is heavily dependent on oxytocin, a
hormone that is endogenously high in females (Taylor, 2002.) This expression of
sadness resulted in increased assistance from affiliates throughout our
evolutionary past, thus increasing the utility and occurrence of this affect
display in females still today. In a study on the value of tears, as the result
of crying, tears communicate sadness and sincerity; these tears in adulthood
serve to mobilize emotional support (Ziefman & Brown, 2011.) These visual
cues of distress are reliable and not easily suppressed (Ziefman & Brown,
2011), especially when we know that this outward expression of distress can be
voluntarily suppressed or exaggerated (Fridlund, 1994.) As Hackenbracht and
Tamir (2010) established, sadness was found to be useful when looking to elicit
help; however, they failed to include sex differences in these preferences
within their analyses. It would be expected that females preferred to elicit
sadness more so than males and consequently, females would be more adept at
doing so. Future research in regard to the utility of sadness, or aggression,
should include how males and females might differ on the emotion they prefer to
elicit and within what context.
These expressions of aggression and
crying in males and females, respectively, in response to distress are effective
at causing others to avoid or affiliate (Vigil, 2008.) Supporting the notion
that effective affect regulation is adaptive, especially when used to optimize
an individual’s social network in order to promote healing and recovery from an
adverse experience (Vigil, 2008.) In conclusion, it should be noted that
nonverbal affect behaviors are specialized across the sexes and effective, thus
consequently adaptive (Vigil, 2008); this reasoning should be attended to when
researching differences in affect regulation strategies.
Limitations
and Future Directions
As with all endeavors, limitations
infiltrate great intentions. As humans evolved the ability to control evolved
preferences through effortful control and the evaluation of infinite cost and
benefits, however, our expansive culture bombards our human brains with
information that might compete with our ability to control automatic processing
(MacDonald, 2008.) The constant exposure to the media expands our immediate
existence to encompass the existence of people that we otherwise would never
meet or see. The mere exposure to supermodel level attractive females might not
have occurred early in our evolutionary past, which in turn clouds our ability
to rate prospective female mates that are encountered daily. Suddenly, the
average male finds no mate sufficient enough in attractiveness (in comparison
to these supermodels) and thus does not mate; this comes as a consequence of
evolution not directly programming humans with a proximal mechanism that
increases fitness (MacDonald, 2008.) As a result, uncertainty lies between what
is deemed as success from an evolutionary standpoint and human psychology
(MacDonald, 2008.)
The human emotions being deemed
useful and shaped by natural selection is something that has taken quite some
time to become accepted, especially when human psychological adaptations are
not as clear-cut and obvious like a turtle’s shell or a tiger’s stripes. The
limitation to seeing affective regulation as an adaptation is the lack of evidence
directly pinning affective regulation as an output of natural selection. These
inferences are made inherently, primarily through speculative efforts; however,
this gap is slowly being closed and it could be proposed that future work in
affect regulation will incorporate evolutionary theory in order to understand
the proximate and ultimate purposes behind effective and adaptive regulation.
As Spoor and Kelly (2004) eloquently
stated, “evolutionary psychology has the potential to provide a unifying theory
for understanding many of the disparate phenomena in psychology” (pg. 409.)
Just as research in emotions benefited from an evolutionary perspective, affect
regulation will benefit wholly from incorporating the theory of evolution into
future research endeavors. Hopefully soon, the use of the term adaptive within
affect regulation literature will be clearly defined and universally
understood. The distinctions between effective and adaptive regulation will be
a thing of the past; future researchers will no longer err in their
classification (see Campos, Walle, Dahl, & Main, 2011.) With that being
said, the instrumental model of emotion regulation might be most accepting of
incorporating evolutionary theory; as Tamir (2011) alluded to, an emotion that
is adaptive in one context might not be adaptive in another and “social context
in which regulation takes place” must be acknowledged (pg. 4.)
Furthermore, research into group
affect and affect regulation through an evolutionary lens might prove to be
beneficial, even to others outside the immediate realm of evolutionary
psychology and affect regulation. For example, it has been shown that emotional
contagion of negative affect might prove to be quite useful, as it brings
awareness to negative aspects of a work environment, which in turn motivates
change (Spoor & Kelly, 2004.) This research into group affect regulation
might help shed light on individuals’ affective regulation, since group affect
is comprised of each individual’s current affective state. When a regulatory
strategy seems not adaptive at the singular level, perhaps examining this
strategy at a group level might reveal intentions. Being aware of the utility
of emotion to communicate hierarchy status, this might shed light on the
previously perceived non-adaptive regulation as an individual with low
self-esteem not celebrating alone at home after receiving an A on a final exam.
The emotion regulation properties of the status hierarchy have been previously
identified: an individual is influenced by affective signals from others and
consequently, these individuals seek out environments that facilitate
regulation (Sloman, Atkinson, Milligan, & Liotti, 2002.) This could explain
why low self-esteem individuals seek to maintain this low status, not only as
self-verification but since they regulate most effectively within their current
status hierarchy; moving social groups might result in a disruption of their
current status, either positively or negatively, and would result in
dysregulation. This evolutionary perspective can consequently reframe low
self-esteem as being a positive adaptive function to avoid conflict (Sloman,
Atkinson, Milligan, & Liotti, 2002.)
Moreover, understanding how psychological
mechanisms evolved can provide clinical insights and improvements. Since
happiness is not the normal state of functioning but rather, a goal to which we
all strive, provides inspiration to alleviate our current discomfort, and thus
consequently continue to improve our fitness (Nesse, 1990.) An evolutionary
perspective provides much needed insight to the realm of emotional disorders.
Recognizing that we have negative affective experiences for good reasons (to
defend against situations that might decrease fitness), clinicians should look
at the current life situation of the individual experiencing this negative
affect (Nesse, 1990.) Understanding the goals of the individual, what
strategies are being used to accomplish those goals, and their ability to
achieve that goal might contribute to the possibility of an emotional disorder
being present (Nesse, 1990.) Although these defensive responses to events seem
to be over responsive, exaggerated, and unbearable, understanding the
evolutionary functions of the emotion will allow us to lessen our once normal
and superiorly adaptive, but superfluous emotional afflictions (Nesse, 1990.)
Concluding, future research should aim to establish what kinds of suffering can
or can not be relieved without compromising an adaptation, and this can only be
accomplished through scrutinization of the evolutionary functions of emotions
(Nesse, 1990.) “Knowledge of the underlying biology [of psychological
mechanisms] informs the integration of art and science” (Sloman, Atkinson,
Milligan, & Liotti, 2002, pg. 324.)
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